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I. Introduction.-Actions for the' malicious prosecution of
persons on criminal charges are familiar to both judges and
lawyers. To put the criminal law in force, maliciously and without probable cause, is a wrongful act, and he who is thereby
injured in person, property or reputation, may obtain satisfaction
from his injurer before a civil tribunal. The courts offer to the
vindictive and malevolent an easy yet terrible engine with which
to carry out the promptings of their malice. While within their
precincts the accused is not to be regarded as guilty until proved
so, yet outside their walls the rule is different, and to be charged
with a crime, so far as the reputation is concerned, is almost as
bad as to be convicted of it. Therefore to charge a citizen with the
commission of a criminal act, and to do so groundlessly and maliVOL. X
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ciously, is a grievous wrong ; therefore the reports teem with cases
in which persons unjustly accused have successfully appealed to
the courts for damages against their traducers. Other ingtances
of oppression through the aid of the law, less frequent but equally
clear, present themhselves. The maliciously attempting to have
one adjudicated a bankrupt (Farley v Danks, 4 El. & Bl. 499), or
adjudged a lunatic (Lockenour v. Sides, 57 Ind. 360), maliciously
arresting another in a civil action (Stone v. Swift, 4 Pick. 389;
Hayden v. Shed, 11 Mass. 500), falsely suing out an attachmenf
against a person's property (Fortman v. 1?ottier, 8 Ohio St. 548),
or maliciously issuing execution for a larger sum than is due
(Churehill v. Siggers, 3 El. & BI. 938), are examples of legal damage resulting from the wrongful exercise of legal remedies other
than criminal. In four of the five cases above instanced, there is
no deprivation of the plaintiff's liberty, and even in the fifth the
proceeding is in no sense in the nature of a prosecution for a crime.
It is thus evident that to sustain an action for a malicious prosecution, it is not essential that the proceeding which is complained of
should have been a criminal one, or that the plaintiff should have
been imprisoned. In the malicious attempts to adjudicate him a
bankrupt or adjudge him a lunatic, his damage lies in the injury
to his reputation, and the expense to which he has been put in
resisting the proceedings; in the malicious attachment of his person, there is little or no injury to the reputation, but there may
have been much expense in procuring bail, and in the two last
cases the damages sustained are principally his costs in seeking
advice and obtaining bondsmen.
Nevertheless, in all the cases above mentioned, the defendant
suffers dimage in his property over and above the ordinary costs
of resisting a civil action ; and the question, will an action lie for
maliciously and vexatiously prosecuting a civil suit against
another where no special damage is incurred, presents itself for
our consideration.
II. Bestraints on vexatious litigation in England.-It has
long been a leading principle of the English law to accord
to every man the utmost liberty of bringing his grievances
before the tribunals cf his counitry; "a man shall not be punished
for suing on writs in the king's courts, whether he have right or
wrong :" Fitzherbert's Nat. Brev. 429. But though the right to
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sue is encouraged and not restricted, appliances for the suppression
of vexatious and unfounded litigations have existed in the English
courts from early times. Prior to the reign of Henry III. no
person could maintain a civil action without having two or more
persons as pledges of prosecution; and if judgment were given
against the plaintiff, or if he deserted his suit, both he and his
pledges were amerced to the king. A failure to find pledges was
a sufficient ground for reversing a judgment on a writ of error.
But this system at length fell into abuse, partly from the fact that,
as they went to the king the injured party himself received no
benefit from- the amercements, and partly because it was abused by
plaintiffs supplying, as pledges, persons of mean estate, or even
imaginary persons: Hlussey v. Moore, 3 Bulstr. 275 ; Law Magazine and Review, September 1876. Then about the middle of the
thirteenth century, Parliament decreed that the successful party
should in all cases receive his costs, which principle obtains in the
English courts to this day.
III. Te action for maliciously prosecuting a civil suit.Views of the old judge.-And so, because the defendant was
considered to be sufficiently recompensed, and the plaintiff sufficiently pfinished, by respectively receiving and paying the costs
of the unfounded suit, the old cases and the early text writers
all concur in denying the right to a civil action in addition. Thus,
in Bacon's Abridgment, tit. Action on the Case (H), p. 141, it is
said: "But it must be observed that there is a great difference
between a false and malicious prosecution by way of indictment
and bringing a civil action ; for in the latter the plaintiff asserts a
right and shall be amerced pro falso clamore ; also, the defendant igentitled to his costs ;'and, therefore, for commencing such
an action, though without sufficient cause, no action on the case
lies." In Buller's Nisi Prius, p. 11, it is said: "In general it is not
actionable to bring a civil action, though there be no good ground
for it, because it is a claim of right, and the plaintiff finds pledge
to prosecute, and is amerciable pro falso clamore, and is liable to
costs." Waterer v. _Freeman, Hobart 205, 266, arose in 1640.
It was an action for wrongfully suing out double executions against
the plaintiff's property, whereby he was twice charged. The
action was sustained, HOBART, 0. J., in the course of his judgment, saying: "If a man sue me in a proper court, yet, if his
suit be utterly without ground of truth, and that' certainly known
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to himself, I may have an action of the case against him for the
undue vexation and damage that he putteth me unto by his ill
practice, though the suit itself be legal, and I cannot complain of
it as it is a suit." Fifty years later we find another case meagerly
reported, and far from clear (Temple v. -illingworth, 12 Mod.
4 (1691), the whole report being. embraced in the two sentences
of the judgment of HOLT, C. J.: "Of late it is held that case will
lie for prosecution in an inferior court where that court his not
The first case in point was at Huntingdon
the jurisdiction.
assizes, and referred to the Common Pleas, and there adjudged
that to sue a man, without any cause of action at all, no action
lies, unless it appears to be with a malicious and vexatious design."
But from a report "of the same case in Shower's Reports 158, it
appears that the plaintiff had been arrested; and it is to be
observed that in the latter report no mention is made by Lord
HOLT of the case at the Huntingdon assizes, neither is it in Carthew 189, where Temple v. A'illingworth is also reported. - Savill
v. Roberts, 12 Mod. 208, decided in. the King's Bench in 1698,
is a much cited case in this connection. The defendant had
indicted the plaintiff for riot; the latter was acquitted, whereupon
he brought an action for damages to his name and property, which
was sustained. HoLr, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the
court, replied to the defendant's argument that no man. should be
responsible for any damages for suing a writ or prosecuting in the
king's courts. " It is to be considered," said he, "first, that there
is a great difference between bringing an action maliciously, and prosecuting an indictment maliciously; and secondly, that the notion
that no action doth lie for bringing an action maliciously is not to
be taken largely and universally but with some restrictions; for,
first, if a man brings an action, he either 'claims a right or complains of an injtuy, and the law always allows him to take his
course of law to obtain his right or be satisfied for his injury, and
this is allowed in all courts. * * * The law hath provided that no
man should prosecute without finding pledges, and that was a security against troublesome actions; then if the plaintiff's suit be
vexatious and groundless, he shall be amerced pro falso clamore,
and though these amercements be now matters of form, and therefore several Acts of Parliament have given costs to defendants,
yet; we must judge by the reason of the law as it stood anciently;
but in case of an indictment, there -is no provision or remedy, but
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by bringing an action; but if it appears that the action is brought
merely for vexation and oppression, the party grieved, in some
cases, shall have action on the case; he shall not, indeed, say
generally, that he falsely and maliciously, without probable cause,
did bring an action, &c., but if he show any special matter whereby
it appears to the court that it was frivolous and vexatious, he shall
have an action, as in the case of Daw v. Swaine, I Sid. 424." In
Parker v. Langley, Gilbert's Cas. 163, decided in 1714, PARKER,
0. J., said : "The applying in a civil action to a court of justice
for satisfaction or redress has .been so much favored, that no action
has ever been allowed against a plaintiff for such suit singly and
directly on pretence of its being false and malicious. * * * An
action upon the case has not yet succeeded (whatever in special
cases they must do), but only where the plaintiff in the first suit
made the course of the court, requiring special bail, a pretence.for
detaining another in prison, and where the malice was so specially
charged that it appeared that the end of the arrest was not the
expectation of benefit to himself by a recovery, but a design of
imprisoning the other." In 1766, Lord CAMDEN said that there
were no cases to be found in the old books of actions for suing
where the plaintiff had no cause of action, but that "of late years
when a man is maliciously held to bail where nothing is owing, or
where he is maliciously arrested for a great deal more than is due,
this action has been held to lie because the costs in the cause are
not a sufficient satisfaction for imprisoning a man unjustly, and
putting him to the difficulty of getting bail for a larger sum than
is due :" Goslin v. Wileock, 2 Wils. 305 (1766).
IV. The principle followed in late years.-The modern English decisions reiterate the conclusions of the older cases without dissent. In the year 1851, while arguing a case before the
full bench of the Common Pleas, the plaintiff's counsel asked:
"Actions for malicious prosecution of criminal charges are of frequent occurrence-upon what principle is it that that sort of action
is maintainable ? Because the process of the queen's court is
made use of for the purpose of oppression. What difference is
there in this respect between process of a criminal and process of
a civil court ?" To this JERvis, 0. J., replied: " Where an
action is wrongfully brought, the costs which the party gets are a
compensation for the wrong; but in criminal proceedings there are
no costs." The counsel then cited from Fitzherbert's Natura
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Brevium, 116 b, where it is said that "if men say and affirm unto
A. that he hath right unto such land and procure and cause him
to sue an action for the same against B., who is tenant of that
land, &c., by which he is of necessity compelled to sell other lands
or tenements for the defence of his land, &c., now he shall have an
action against those who procure or conspire to cause A. to bring
But WILLIAMS, J., answered: "That may be,
his action."
though it is not so put, on the ground that no costs were recoverable in a real action :" Cottereil v. Jones, 11 0. B. 715
(1851). In this case the action was against two persons for conspiring together maliciously and vexatiously to commence an
unfounded action against the plaintiff in the name of a third, a
pauper, and in pursuance thereof so commencing and prosecuting
it, whereby, although the pauper was nonsuited, the plaintiff was
unable to obtain his costs against him. The plaintiff had a verdict
for the amount of the costs incurred by him in the former action,
but on appeal the judgment was set aside on a question 6f pleading, the court holding that the declaration did not show a cause of
action, because it did not allege that" on the nonsuit the costs had
been awarded by the court against the pauper. Nevertheless the
language of the judges must be noticed in examining our subject.
cc It is conceded," said JERlVIs, 0. J., "that if the party so wrongfully put forward as plaintiff in the former action had been a person
in solvent circumstances, this action could not have been maintained, inasmuch as the award of costs to the defendant (the now
plaintiff) upon the failure of that action, would in contemplation
of law, have been a full compensation to him for ,the unjust vexation, and consequently he would have sustained no damage."
MAULE, J., said: "It is conceded that this action could not
be maintained in respect of extra costs, that is, costs ultra, the
costs given by statute to a successful defendant." And TALFOURD, J., added: "It appears from the whole current of authorities that an action of this description, if maintainable at all, is only
maintainable in respect of legal damage actually sustained; and
that the mere expenditure of money by the plaintiff in the defence
of the action brought against him does not constitute such legal
damage; but that the only measuie of damage is the costs ascertained by the usual course of law. There being no averment in
this declaration that any such costs were incurred or awarded, no
legal ground is disclosed for the maintenance of the action."
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_Purton v. Honnor, 1 Bos. & Pul. 205 (1798), was an action
on the case to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff in
defending a vexatious ejectment suit brought against him by the
defendant in which the nominal plaintiff had been non prdssed.
There was a general demurrer to the declaration and joinder. The
case came on before the Common Pleas on a day set for the
purpose of hearing the plaintiff's couns'el in support of the declara-:
tion, but the court expressing themselves as being clearly of
opinion on the authority of -Seville v. Boberts, supra, that such an
action was not maintainable, he declined arguing the point, and the
court gave judgment for the defendant.
V. Opinions of the American text writers.-In Swift's Digest
published in 1849, Dutton & Cowdry's ed., p. 492, it is
said: "It is well settled that at common law no action will lie
against one for bringing a civil suit, however malicious and unfounded, unless the body of the party is imprisoned or holden to
bail. in all other cases the costs the party recovers is supposed to
be an adequate compensation for the damage which he sustains.
Of course where the process is by summons only, there can be no
action for a malicious suit ; it can only lie in cases where the process is by attachment, for there no cost is allowed which can be
a compensation for the personal injury. Whenever one person
causes another to be arrested or attached and holden to bail, or
imprisoned, where there is no debt due, or for a greater sum than
is due, with a malicious intent to injure and oppress him, action
will lie." The editors of the American Leading Cases, vol. 1, p.
261, in their note to Munns v. Dupont, 3 Wash. 0. Ct. 31 (1811),
unqualifiedly lay it down that the action of malicious prosecution
will not lie-for the mere institution of a-civil suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction, where the person is not arrested or held to
bail, or his property attached, or other grievance occasioned, because
the costs are considered a sufficient compensation. The cases, they
say, where the general principle has been asserted that an action
will lie for any civil suit maliciously and groundlessly instituted,
were not cases of malicious prosecution but of malicious abuse of
the process of law ; and further on, the cases in which an action
for malicious abuse of process is sustainable are stated to be five,
viz.: where a capias is sued out for some collateral object ofoppression; where a second capias is issued from vexatious
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motives; where a ca. sa. is sued out irregularly, afi.fa. being still
out; where, under afi.J. on a judgment oh a bond with penalty,
the plaintiff directs goods to be levied on and sold to the amount
of the penalty, or in double the amount of the debt due on it; and
where the defendant is arrested on a ca. sa. for a larger sum than
is due. The case of an ordinary suit without these collateral or
extraordinary features, is not included in this category. In
Weeks's Damnum Absque Injuria, sect. 70, it is said: "If a
person prosecutes a civil action against another maliciously, and
without reasonable and probable cause, no action for damages can
usually be supported against the prosecutor. A man may, if he
fancies he has a civil action against another, prosecute his claim,
however false or unfounded it may be. The rules governing malicious prosecutions in the criminal courts do not apply. It cannot,
however, be denied that in cases of extremely vexatious suits, where
special damage has been actually suffered, alleged and shown, the
action has been allowed." In Cooley on Torts, p. 189, it is said :
"If every suit may be retried on an allegation of malice the evils
would be intolerable, and the malice in each subsequent suit would
be likely to be greater than in the first." Mr. Townshend, in his
essay on Malicious Prosecution (Townshend on Slander and Libel,
sect. 410), says: "Ordinarily a civil action involves the defendant
merely in the costs of his defence, and in civil actions, with rare
exceptions, the award of costs to the defendant is the only penalty
to which the plaintiff is subjected for having made an unfounded
complaint. But where in a civil action the defendant is held to
bail or imprisoned, he has, under certain circumstances, a remedy
by action, and such an action is usually denominated- an action for
malicious prosecution. Without insisting that this is improper,
we exclude such actions from our consideration, and confine
ourselves exclusively to the action for making a criminal charge
In
maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause."
the American edition of Addison on Torts, sect. 863, it is said:
"If one man prosecutes a civil action against another maliciously
and without reasonable and probable cause, an action for damages
is not maintainable ag-einst the prosecutor of the action. There is
a.great difference between the bringing of an action and indicting
maliciously and without cause. Where a man brings an action he
claims a right to himself or complains of an injury done to him ;
and if a man fancies he has a cause of action he may sue and put
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forward his claim, however false and unfounded it may be. The
common law, in order to hinder malicious and frivolous and vexatious suits, provided that every plaintiff should find pledges which
were amerced if the claim were false: But that method became
disused, and then to supply it the statutes gave costs to the
successful defendants. But there was no amercement upon indictments, and the party had not any remedy to reimburse himself
but by action. But if.A. sues an action against B. for mere vexation, in some cases, upon particular damage, B. may have an
action, but it is not enough to say that A. sued him falso et malitrose, but he must show the matter of the grievance specially, so
that it may appear to the court to be manifestly malicious." In
Hilliard on Torts, p. 422, it is said: "It has been sometimes held
that an action for a malicious prosecution will not lie for bringing
a civil suit, although it were groundless. * * * The explanation
of this difference between criminal prosecutions and civil actions is
found in part in the fact that the common law in orde! to hinder
malicious, frivolous and vexatious suits, provided that every plaintiff should find pledges which were amerced if the claim was false.
And after this practice ceased statutes provided costs for a prevailing defendant. But the qualified doctrine is now well settled in
relation to civil actions, corresponding with the rule as to criminal
prosecutions, that no action lies to recover damages sustained by
being sued in a civil action, unless it was malicious and without
probable cause: Baugh v. Killingworth, 4 Mod. 14 (1690);
White v. Dingley, 4 Mass. 433 (1808); Cox v. Taylor, 10 B.
Mon. 17 (1849); Wengert v. Beashore, 1 Penn. St. 232 (1830) ;
ffernzan v. Brookerhoof, 8 Watts 240 (1839); Jamison v. 11lcIntosh, 12 La. Ann. 785 (1857); Besson v. Southard, 10 N. Y.
236 (1851). Of the cases cited by Mr. Hilliard not a single one
sustains the proposition that an ordinary civil suit, where there has
been no arrest of the person or no taking of property out of the
possession or disposal of the defendant by attachment or injunction,
may become the subject of another action if prosecuted maliciously
and without probable cause. In Baugh v. Killingworth, Wengert
v. Beashore, Herman v. Brookerhoof and Besson v. Southard,the
plaintiff had been arrested by the defendant under a capias in the
former suit. White v. -Dingley involved no different principle.
The creditors of White had by deed covenanted with him that they
would not sue or arrest him for any demands due by him to them
VOL. XXX.-37

